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INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: CAPITAL
VS. LABOR
David P. Hariton"
It is a great pleasure to read a paper by someone who
writes so well, from whom well-turned phrases flow so readily,
rendering even the most difficult subject matter easy to digest.
And this paper well serves its role, which is to stimulate further thought. It is a broad and comprehensive essay.
I must confess, of course, that I was surprised to learn
that our rules for the taxation of cross-border investment have
been founded solely on concerns of worldwide economic efficiency. I had assumed that academics spent time discussing
this matter because they feared that politicians and administrators would not, and they did not want it to be overlooked,
particularly given the principle of retaliation (i.e., if our efforts
to use our cross-border tax policies to enrich ourselves are-as
Professor Graetz suggests-likely to be copied by the rest of
the world, we might at least wind up with a world that is economically efficient). Certainly such perusals of the legislative
history of statutes, and of the preambles to regulatory issuances, as I have made in the course of my practice, do not suggest
that the people who are responsible for our rules on cross-border taxation have been obsessed by matters of worldwide economic efficiency, or even of national economic efficiency. If that
is the subject that has preoccupied the academy, then it would
appear that the academy has had relatively little influence.
Rather, the people responsible for the rules that I
have encountered have been concerned (not surprisingly) with
who pays for the cost of our government, and I do not mean
* The author has been a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell since 1994, where
he specializes in U.S. federal income tax matters, including the taxation of financial instruments and products; corporate mergers, acquisitions and distributions;
and international operations, investments, and transactions. Mr. Hariton has written and lectured extensively on the federal income tax treatment of financial
transactions, contingent debt instruments, debt-equity hybrids, corporate tax shelters, foreign currency obligations, foreign currency swaps, equity-indexed swaps,
recapitalizations, interest expense allocations, and outbound distributions and liquidations. He currently serves as co-chair of the Committee on Tax Policy of the
New York State Bar Association Tax Section. Mr. Hariton is a graduate of Stanford University and Stanford Law School.
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which nation-I mean which Americans. I thought, for example,
that the heart of the capital export neutrality debate was this:
According to the Democrats, if U.S. corporations are forced to
export most of their capital to low-tax foreign jurisdictions,
then the United States will not collect any tax in respect to the
income derived by that capital, and labor will be forced to
make up the difference. According to the Republicans, if U.S.
corporations are prevented from so exporting their capital, the
world's markets will be exploited instead by foreign corporations which (like the beast in Alien), having grown large on
their feedings abroad, will invade the domestic market, and we
shall all suffer the fate of the 1970s. There is, of course, much
to be said in response. To the Democrats, that like an ocean,
the liquid flow of portfolio investment equalizes capital investment in labor worldwide, and thus, to the extent that domestic
corporations export capital to exploit investment opportunities
abroad, foreign capital will flow inbound to exploit U.S. investment opportunities and support domestic labor. To the Republicans, that profits from the exploitation of worldwide markets
go to capital, not labor, and the idea of shifting the cost of
government from those who have so much money that they can
think of nothing better to do with it than invest it in U.S.
multinationals to those who cannot yet afford to buy their first
homes is perverse, particularly given the current state of our
schools, neighborhoods, healthcare and infrastructure. But I
don't frankly recall the participants in this debate referencing
worldwide economic efficiency to any great extent, although
I'm sure they must have-they referenced everything else.
Certainly this is the theme that I have seen played out of
late in the debates over Notices 98-5 and 98-11, over Section
894(c) and the associated regulations, over interest expense
allocation, over subpart F re-examination and the problem of
"mobile" capital, and over the growing arsenal of cross-border
transactions designed to lower U.S. and foreign tax. I therefore
think that when Professor Graetz declares in Part III of his
paper that, having set aside all this nonsense about worldwide
economic efficiency, "We can now ask the straightforward but
difficult question: What international tax policy is in the best
interests of the people of the United States,
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aside a straw horse and begged the very question that lies at
the heart of our cross-border tax policy. The question is not
"what policy is in the best interests of the people of the United
States?," but "which policy is in the interests of which people
in the United States?"
More gripping, for me at least, is the more technical discussion of outdated legal concepts in Part H of the paper. It
seems clear to me as a practitioner that the current rules of
taxation based on legal formalisms, on economically meaningless distinctions between corporations, partnerships, and
branches, and on equally meaningless "transactions" among
related entities, produce results that are complex, arbitrary
and subject to manipulation. I likewise agree that these rules
are outdated, modeled as they are on the "manufacture and
sale of widgets" model that characterized the industrial economy of a century ago. As the recent efforts to grapple with the
income derived by financial institutions from "global dealing"
suggest, we would be far better off determining a single worldwide income, assessing a single tax, and dividing it up
amongst participating nations based on some sort of apportionment formula. However, this would require far more cooperation in the international arena than we have at present. Indeed, if the European Union should founder, it shall be more
on questions of taxation than of monetary policy.
As for the question that Professor Graetz has in fact
asked-what policy is in the best interests of the United States
as a whole?-I do think that there are some changes in policy
that might benefit everyone in the United States more or less,
primarily at the expense of foreigners, and thus assuming no
retaliation, our policy might be improved. For example, it
strikes me as odd that in the midst of the heated capital export
debate, our policy with respect to the attraction of inbound
portfolio capital is virtually ignored. While crying "capital poor"
with respect to the allocation of our own savings, we seem to
be throwing foreign capital away with both hands. How can we
ask foreign investors in U.S. equities to pay tax on the income
they derive at the domestic corporate level and then a second
time when the income is withdrawn, all before the income even
reaches their local shores? We should be grateful, rather than

Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1357 (2001).
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troubled, when foreign investors use derivatives to avoid the
second tax by characterizing the nominal form of their investments in the United States as inbound loans. So backwards
has our policy been in this regard that it took us until the
1980s to repeal the U.S. withholding tax on outbound payments of interest, and then only because business had already
managed a de facto repeal of the tax through the use of the
Netherlands Antilles.
However, I don't feel the same way about the two changes
proposed by Professor Graetz. The first of these is that we
move from a credit system to an exemption system in dealing
with the foreign source income derived by U.S. multinationals.
This generally would permit U.S. multinationals to invest
capital in low-tax foreign jurisdictions and repatriate the earnings free of U.S. tax. That is, of course, the proposal that Republicans consistently make in the name of national competitiveness or capital import neutrality, and that Democrats consistently oppose based on concerns about "runaway plants" and
capital export neutrality. In other words, it is a proposal that
favors capital over labor. Regardless of what can be said for or
against this proposal, I don't see how it can be viewed as a
proposal that is "in the best interests of the people of the United States" as a whole. 2
The second proposal is to deny foreign tax credits to U.S.
individuals. This proposal may well support labor more than
capital, but I'm not sure I understand the analysis that leads
Professor Graetz to that proposal. He points out that the income from outbound portfolio investment is subject to relatively low rates of foreign tax, an undeniable fact. He appears to
conclude from this, however, that such investment is tax-advantaged as compared to domestic portfolio investment. But of
course, given that we have not yet adopted an exclusion system
for foreign source income, income from outbound portfolio investment is subject to the same amount of tax as income from
domestic portfolio investment. How then does it follow that the
former is tax advantaged, and how would it help to repeal the
foreign tax credit, thereby rendering the former tax disadvantaged? Professor Graetz effectively is proposing that we permit
Americans to invest their capital abroad only if they do so

2. Id.
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through domestic corporations. The foreign source income
earned by these domestic corporations would then be free altogether of U.S. tax under Professor Graetz's first proposal. It is
not clear to me how this plan would favor all Americans or
why it would be better than our current system.
In any event, the real point of Professor Graetz's paper is
that we should be thinking more about our foreign tax rules
and the policies behind them. With this I wholeheartedly
agree. It is a great pleasure to read such a well-written and
thought-provoking piece.

